

~~SECRET~~NIE 11-13: Soviet Foreign Policy in Light of the Summit ConferenceI. The Current Situation

- A. Soviet intentions have yet to be tested; both the USSR and the West did not regard Geneva as a meeting to reduce problems. The UN disarmament talks, perhaps the Adenauer visit, and the October Foreign Minister's meeting will be tests. President's speech and Dulles press conference virtually ignored.
- B. Soviet actions toward reducing tension continue daily with promises of more to come so that their actual scope still remains to be seen.
- C. Soviet positions and particularly behavior has shown some change.
1. Substantive changes: Austria, Yugoslavia, disarmament (level of forces, phased abolition of atomic weapons, importance of inspections), East-West contacts, participation in atomic pool.
  2. Optimism after Geneva -- "new stage," "everything will be better."
  3. New civility toward old controversies.
  4. Reduction in tension-building articles in Soviet press.
  5. Change in treatment of US (July 4, texts, soft-pedal criticism, some praise, delegations).
  6. Expressions of relaxation (open car, garden party, "tourism").
  7. Gestures (release of foreigners, state visits, correspondents, 640,000 troop reductions).
  8. More realistic attitude toward foreign science and technology (possible significance of Institute of Economy of Contemporary Capitalism).
- D. On other points USSR has remained firm.
1. NATO - Bulganin reaffirmed long-term aim of getting all foreign soldiers out of Europe.
  2. Germany - position has hardened since Paris agreements.
  3. Satellites and Communism excluded from discussion.
  4. New planes and armaments in bloc as well as USSR show modernization continues; post-Geneva atomic tests.
  5. Heavy industry priority - no diversion.
  6. Jamming and control of publications.
  7. Increased activities in Near East.
  8. Peace partisans successful, but aggressive circles only retreated (Bulganin, Kominist, Vronsky, Dulles, more pointed criticisms).
  9. Troops in Hungary and Rumania.

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☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

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E. Comparison with past conciliatory periods.

- (1) peace offensives under Stalin involved many of same features, pressed less actively and less broadly.
- (2) since Stalin general line, with some exceptions, has been toward improvement in relations - Korea, Austria, (no pressure), West Germany, Yugoslavia, neighbors.
- (3) present behavior largely intensification of pre-Geneva trends, with difference that Soviet people are now better informed of improvement.

F. The Soviet view

- (1) Necessary to relax tensions and develop trust -- put an end to the cold war -- because of danger of war and burden of arms race.
- (2) Geneva fulfilled mission of relaxing tensions, creating "new stage" in relations -- although aggressive forces have only retreated temporarily.
- (3) "New stage" came about because of
  - (a) Soviet pre-Geneva actions (Korea, Austria, Yugoslavia, Japan, West Germany, Bulganin's "18 months to 2 years."
  - (b) peace movement.
  - (c) mutual confidence engendered at Geneva.
- (4) As a result of Geneva, atmosphere is better, but difficulties remain - Bulganin "The position of strength policy was put aside at Geneva."
- (5) "Negotiations and not force must be the principle for relations among states - " Bulganin. With proper confidence, problems can be solved.
- (6) Except for Soviet ignored Khrushchev statement, nothing comparable to MacMillan's "there ain't gonna be no war."

II. Pattern of Soviet Moves

What do they add up to with regard to Soviet intentions?

1. Concerted, intensive and probably prolonged effort to improve relations and give appearance of less international tension.  
Correction of Stalin's failure to pull out psychological rug from under Western collective defense efforts.
  - A. Reduction of tension simply through normalization of relations. Retreat from more insular aspects of Stalin's policy.
  - B. Marked intensification of already growing cultural exchanges.
  - C. For the moment at least, self-restraint on most Communist tension-building actions.

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2. A new drive to make the concept of "mutual trust" -- embodied in the expression "spirit of Geneva" -- a universally accepted good and a goal in itself.
  - A. Moscow has already sought to make the "spirit of Geneva" as a criterion for measuring words and actions of various powers. Formula already used to criticize the US.
  - B. Goal of mutual trust permits USSR to challenge West to match Soviet moves in support of Geneva spirit. Effect on Western unity of US actions in support of trust and effect on neutrals of US failure to reciprocate?
  - C. Mutual trust becomes issue in itself to hamper negotiations. Paris agreements hinder mutual trust. Armaments inspection dependent on mutual trust.
3. Continued concentration on negating Western defense arrangements without involving Soviet territorial concessions.
  - A. Focus on all-European security plan
  - B. Championship of neutrality and guarantees
  - C. Stress on negotiations rather than force
  - D. Germany and satellites untouched
  - E. Insistence on Western moves in field of disarmament
4. In essence, to relax cold war on basis of status quo in Europe and commitment not to use force.

### III. Soviet Motivations

Timing of change in behavior may throw light on motivations. Behavior improved immediately after Stalin's death. Tough line slowly returned and reached high point in November-December 1954. Break on Austrian treaty on February 8. Conciliatory approach speeds up in March (French ratification of Paris agreements) and again moves ahead after Geneva.

Combination of reasons for change.

1. New leadership and opportunity for greater flexibility in achieving old goals.
  - a) criticism of Stalin; closing out dead end policies;
  - b) Khrushchev's "only right decision"
  - c) Tito's description reprinted
  - d) Molotov, Feb. 8, peace efforts "should be pursued with greater insistence, skill, and consistency."
2. Concern with drift toward nuclear war
  - a) Rearmament of Western Germany
  - b) Unity of Western alliance
  - c) economic effects of arms race with 1956 year upcoming

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